Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
JALLALUDIN ABDULRAHMAN |
G.R. No. 151458 |
|
GULAM, |
|
|
Petitioner, |
Present: |
|
|
|
|
|
PANGANIBAN, CJ., Chairperson, |
|
|
YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
|
- versus - |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
|
|
CALLEJO, SR. and |
|
|
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
|
|
|
|
SPOUSES CATALINO and |
Promulgated: |
|
RICARDA |
August 31, 2006 |
|
Respondents. |
|
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The question of whether or not petitioner has fully paid the stipulated price under the Contract to Sell between him and respondents is a question of fact that is not proper in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as only questions of law may be raised therein,[1] save for certain exceptions,[2] which are not present in this case.
Petitioner and respondents entered
into a Contract to Sell on January 1994, whereby the latter agreed to sell to
petitioner a 72-square meter parcel of land located in Sampaloc, P1,700,000.00, including a 2-storey townhouse to be
constructed by respondents on the property.
The terms of payment were as follows: P500,000.00 to be paid on
the first month of construction, another P500,000.00 to be paid on the
second month of construction, the remaining balance to be added on the full
payment of the contract price; and a reservation of P50,000.00 shall be
paid by petitioner. A final deed of sale
shall be executed by respondents upon full payment of the contract price, with
petitioner bearing the costs of the taxes.
Written on the contract is the note: “Received the amount of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos only (P500,000.00) representing Partial Payment
of Full Downpayment.”
Two years after the execution of the
Contract to Sell, petitioner filed against respondents an action for Specific
Performance, asking the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of P2,050,000.00, broken down as follows:
UCPB Check No. 157244 dated P 50,000.00
UCPB Check CMRO 19635 dated P
500,000.00
UCPB Check CMRO 40154 dated P
300,000.00
Private receipt made on P
500,000.00
UCPB Check CMRO 40154 dated P
200,000.00
Private receipt in the contract to sell P
500,000.00[3]
Respondents denied petitioner’s
allegations, claiming that petitioner is yet to fully pay the agreed price,
having paid only P1,000,000.00, exclusive of
the P50,000.00 reservation fee.
According to respondents, petitioner paid P500,000.00 upon the
execution of the Contract to Sell, as acknowledged in the Contract to Sell, and
another P500,000,00 in two separate payments made in March 1994. Thus, respondents set up a counter-claim by
asking for the rescission of the contract due to petitioner’s refusal to abide
by its terms.
On
WHEREFORE, the foregoing facts considered, the case against the defendant is hereby dismissed. The reciprocal obligation between the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby ordered rescinded under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. This Article recognizes an implied or tacit revolutionary condition in reciprocal obligations. It is a condition imposed exclusively by law, even if there is no corresponding agreement between the parties. In reciprocal obligations, when one party has performed his part of the contract, the other party incurs in delay hence, the party who has performed or is ready and willing to perform may rescind the obligation if the other does not perform or is not ready and willing to perform (Civil Code of the Phils. Vol. IV Tolentino, 1986 ed p. 176).
Under the circumstances the failure of the plaintiff to pay their correlative obligation was not a casual breach but it was a breach of contract tainted with fraud or malice (dolo) as distinguished from mere negligence (culpa) (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Wantime Building Co., Inc. 43 SCRA 93).
The
amount of P1,100,000.00, the amount admitted by the defendant to have
been paid by the plaintiffs and received by herein defendant is hereby declared
as forfeited in favor of the defendants to be applied as rental of the house
from June of 1994 up to the time of rendition of judgment and the payment of P20,000.00
a month from the time of rendition of the judgment until the plaintiff and all
persons claiming rights under him shall have finally vacated the premises, and
to pay the amount of P200,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees for unjustly
refusing to comply with their obligation in bad faith thus forcing the
defendants to litigate this matter in court.
The amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages and to pay the
amount of P100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages and cost.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as
G.R. CV No. 62803, and in a Decision[5]
promulgated on
IN VIEW
OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of attorney’s
fees as well as moral damages is reduced to P75,000.00 and P50,000.00,
respectively. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner
sought reconsideration of the decision but this was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
First Assigned Error
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF VIOLATED SECTIONS 20[8] AND 22[9] OF RULE 132 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
Second Assigned Error
THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF MR. GULAM DID NOT OR WAS
INCOMPETENT TO TESTIFY ON DUE EXECUTION OF THE RECEIPT IN THE CONTRACT TO SELL,
NORHAYA, THE PLAINTIFF’S WIFE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASKED INSTEAD SINCE SHE WOULD BE
COMPETENT ON THIS MATTER BUT THE ISSUE ON SAID RECEIPT ON THE CONTRACT TO SELL
WAS INSTEAD AVOIDED ON DIRECT EXAMINATION, MR. GULAM WAS ALSO DECLARED
INCOMPETENT TO TESTIFY ON THE MARCH 9, 1994 RECEIPT FOR THE AMOUNT OF P500,000.00
SINCE IT WAS NORHAYA WHO MADE THE PAYMENT THEREOF, MR GULAM CANNOT TESTIFY ON
THE DUE EXECUTION OF SAID RECEIPT.
Fourth Assigned Error [sic]
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF MISERABLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH THEIR CLAIM, THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS ARE HEREBY DISMISSED AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS HAVING PROVED OR ESTABLISHED THEIR CLAIM THROUGH PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF TRIED TO AVOID THEIR OBLIGATION IN RECIPROCAL ONE BY FRAUDULENT MEANS WITH THE USE OF CLEAVER [sic] MANIPULATIONS IN EVIDENT BAD FAITH SHOWS THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT.
Fifth Assigned Error [sic]
THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AMOUNT OF P1,100,000.00
ADMITTED BY THE DEFENDANT [sic] TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY PLAINTIFFS AND RECEIVED
TO BE APPLIED AS PAYMENT OR RENTAL OF THE HOUSE FROM JUNE 1994 TO THE TIME OF
RENDITION OF THE JUDGMENT AND PAYMENT OF P20,000.00 A MONTH FROM THE
TIME OF RENDITION OF THE JUDGMENT UNTIL THE PLAINTIFF AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING
RIGHTS UNDER HIM SHALL HAVE FINALLY VACATED THE PREMISES.[10]
The Court notes that the above-quoted assignment of errors is an exact reproduction of assigned errors I, III, IV and V raised in the appeal brief filed by petitioner with the CA, except assigned error II,[11] which was not raised in the present petition.
As Comment, respondents adopted their Defendants-Appellees’ Brief filed with the CA.
Petitioner’s arguments basically
hinge on his claim of overpayment. These
arguments, however, do not raise any question of law. As stated at the outset, the principal issue
in this case, i.e., whether
petitioner has fully paid the stipulated price under the Contract to Sell, thus
entitling him to the execution of a final deed of sale, is one of fact, which
is beyond the
As earlier mentioned, the exceptions adverted to, to wit:[12]
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court are contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings
of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts;
(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the
issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeal are premised on
the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record.
are not present in the present case.
Moreover, the Court finds no plausible reason to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered by the RTC and the CA, especially since these findings are not tainted with any capriciousness or palpable error. The rule is that where the factual findings of both courts are in accord, the same are binding on this Court.[13]
The RTC sifted through the evidence on record, testimonial as well as
documentary, to determine the veracity of petitioner’s
claim that there was overpayment, due to the alleged issuance of several checks
and cash payments to respondents, and ruled that petitioner failed to prove his
claim of overpayment. It was the RTC’s
finding that the receipt acknowledging the payment of the sum of P500,000.00,
which allegedly was signed by respondent Ricarda Santos (Santos) on March 9,
1994 and which was examined by the NBI, cannot be given any credence because
Santos denied having furnished any specimen signature from which the signature
in the receipt may be compared, in violation of Sections 20 and 22 of the Rules
of Court. Instead, the RTC gave weight
to the conclusion of the PNP Crime Laboratory that “the documents were written
by two different persons.” The RTC also
observed that the issuance by petitioner of UCPB Check No. CMR0 19635 dated P500,000.00 is actually the payment acknowledged in the contract
as it coincides with the stipulation in the contract wherein petitioner had to
pay P500,000.00 on the first month of construction, which in fact,
started in January 1994. The RTC also ruled
that petitioner cannot testify on the alleged receipt of these contested
amounts as he was not present during the time that it was made, since according
to petitioner himself, it was his wife Norhaya who allegedly made the payments.[14] The RTC, meanwhile, gave credence to
respondent’s claim that petitioner is yet to pay the full amount of the
purchase price, relying on the two letters sent by petitioner’s wife Norhaya to
Santos admitting that the amount of P1,100,000.00 has already been given
to respondents, and a balance of P446,036.00 in the purchase price
remains, exclusive of the cost of labor and improvements, and which Norhaya
seeks to reimburse from respondents.[15]
The CA
sustained the RTC’s findings, stating that the receipt dated
In the
final analysis, it is apparent that appellant has not kept his own end of the
bargain in the Contract. A computation
of the payments made based on evidence on hand, without including the bogus
receipt dated March 9, 1994, would eventually show that appellant had only paid
a total of P1,100,000.00, thus leaving an unpaid balance of more or less
P600,000.00 (Exhibit “13”). This
is bolstered by the appellant’s admission in a letter addressed to appellees
through his counsel (Exhibit “3”) wherein he asserted that he had already paid P1,500,000.00. Likewise, in a letter by appellant’s wife to
appellees, admitting having paid only P1,500,000.00. This is contrary to his later claim that he
had already paid a total of P2,050,000.00 by
All told, We are in accord with the finding of the lower court that appellant committed a substantial breach when he tried to weasel out of his obligation through fraudulent means by utilizing a forged check and receipt. Appellant’s vain attempt to cloak with legal color his devious scheme to acquire at all costs the house and lot at the expense of the rightful owner. Correspondingly, appellees are entitled to avail of the provisions of Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which authorizes an injured party in a reciprocal obligation to rescind an obligation to be decreed by the court, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. Surely, the introduction of forged documents can be considered a significant breach in the reciprocal obligation as would warrant the resolution of the contract. [16]
x x x x
The Court agrees with the foregoing evaluation of both the RTC and the CA, as it finds support in the evidence on record. Despite his protestations, petitioner failed to show any reversible error committed by the RTC and the CA.
Petitioner, however, insists that the CA erred in holding that his testimony with regard to the payments made by his wife was hearsay. Petitioner argues that the purpose of such testimony was merely to establish the fact that such statement was made.
It is a hornbook doctrine of evidence that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from his perception.[17] A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more importantly, have not been subjected to cross-examination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity, and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.[18]
True, petitioner’s statements may be considered as independently relevant statements and may be admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered.[19] However, the admissibility of his testimony to such effect should not be equated with its weight and sufficiency.[20] Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.[21] In this case, both the RTC and the CA refused to give credence to petitioner’s testimony, and the Court finds no reason to doubt the assessments made by both courts. Even assuming that his wife, indeed, told him that payments were made on these dates, still, it does not follow that it is sufficient proof to establish his claim of overpayment. These should be weighed vis-à-vis the other evidence on record, which, as appraised by the RTC and the CA, do not support petitioner’s claim.
Although Norhaya
testified, she did not, however, give any credible testimony regarding these
alleged payments. In fact, Norhaya
failed to testify on the alleged separate payment made in the amount of P500,000.00,
which was annotated on the Contract to Sell.[22] With regard to the alleged payment and
receipt made on
Finally, petitioner laments the
disregard made on the NBI finding that the signature of respondent
A fortiori, We agree with the trial court that the NBI expert is considered to have no adequate knowledge of the genuine signatures of the parties whose signatures are claimed to be forged, for this witness was not in possession of the genuine signatures of the appellees. Moreover, opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the courts, the experts’ function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. x x x[27]
Verily, the RTC and the CA did not err in dismissing petitioner’s complaint and ordering the rescission of the Contract to Sell.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1]
Air Philippines Corporation v. International
Business Aviation Services Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 151963,
[2] Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997).
[3] Records, pp. 1-4.
[4]
[5] Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Sergio L. Pestaño, concurring.
[6] CA rollo, p. 137.
[7]
[8] Proof of Private Document.
[9] How Genuineness of Authenticity Proved.
[10] Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[11] II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS WITNESS LACKS THAT CANDOR AND TRUTHFULNESS AS THEY TRIED TO SEEK REFUGE AND BASED THEIR CLAIM ON SPECULATIONS, THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION NOT HAVING ANY LEGS to stand on must fall and are therefore estopped from denying the existence of defendants (sic) CLAIM.
[12] Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 2, at 1168-1169.
[13] David v. Manila Bulletin Publishing Company, Inc., 400 Phil. 838, 845. (2000).
[14] Records, pp. 364-371.
[15] See Exhibits 11 to 12-D, id. at 273-278.
[16] CA rollo, p. 136.
[17] Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 36.
[18]
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v.
[19]
People v. Velasquez, G.R. Nos. 132635 & 143872–75,
[20] People
v. Manhuyod, Jr., 352 Phil. 866, 885
(1998).
[21] People
v. Navarro, 357 Phil. 1010, 1031 (1998).
[22]
See TSN, September 25 and
[23]
TSN,
[24]
TSN,
[25] Cirelos v. Hernandez, G.R.
No. 146523,
[26]
[27] CA rollo, p. 135.